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ABSTRACT
Ricci v. DeStefano, the New Haven firefighters case, raised questions
about the constitutionality of the disparate impact provisions of federal
employment discrimination law. This Article draws on the Court's
subsequent decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin to clarify
disparate impact's constitutionality. In Fisher, no Justice expressed
concern about Texas's decision to promote diversity at the state university
by admitting the top percent of the state's high school graduates-state
action that is race-conscious in purpose, but race-neutral in form.
Approval of the percent plan in Fisher shows that under equal protection
Nicholas de B. Katzenbach Professor of Law, Yale University. This Essay was first given as
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faculty for the invitation and the opportunity to discuss this year's equality-themed Meador Lectures.
Jack Balkin, Josh Civin, Robert Post, Richard Primus, and Neil Siegel provided helpful comments on
this draft. For wide-ranging conversation and excellent research assistance, I am grateful to Rachel
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law of the Roberts Court disparate impact law is not unconstitutional in
purpose, as Justice Scalia suggested in Ricci.
In Fisher, the Court has demonstrated that government may change the
selection standards in competitive processes without triggering strict
scrutiny if the government acts (1) with a race-conscious goal ofpromoting
equal opportunity; (2) the government requires a selection standard that is
appropriate for the context; and (3) the standard does not classify
individuals by race. These principles are satisfied in the ordinary case of
voluntary disparate impact compliance in which an employer specifies
conditions for employment in advance of evaluating applicants for the job
in question, as well as in prospective remedies that courts ordinarily order
for violations of Title VII.
Fisher clarifies that the problem in Ricci was New Haven's
procedurally irregular means of complying with disparate impact law: the
government discarded the test results of a group of applicants who had
invested significant time in studying for a promotion exam, and explained
this decision in terms which left the disappointed applicants with the
impression that government was discarding their scores to advance the
interests of another racially defined group. By avoiding a constitutional
judgment and finding New Haven's manner of complying with the statute
unlawful disparate treatment, Justice Kennedy warns that interventions
designed to heal social division should be implemented in ways that
endeavor not to aggravate social division.
Disparate impact law can promote equal opportunity, increase
employee confidence in the fairness of selection criteria, and so reduce
racial balkanization; but for disparate impact law to do so, Justice
Kennedy seems to be saying in Ricci, disparate impact law needs to be
enforced with attention to all employees' expectations offair dealing.
INTRODUCTION
In Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court raised and avoided questions about the
constitutionality of actions taken by a public employer complying with
disparate impact provisions of federal employment discrimination law. A
concurring opinion by Justice Scalia warned of a coming "war between
disparate impact and equal protection,"2 and suggested that laws imposing
disparate impact liability might reflect an invidious discriminatory
1. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).




purpose. Since Ricci, the Supreme Court has twice accepted cases
involving Fair Housing Act disparate impact claims, only to have the
parties settle before the Court heard argument.4 This Term, the Court has
again accepted a case concerning the availability of disparate impact claims
under the Fair Housing Act, in which the defendant asserts similar claims
for constitutional avoidance.
In this Article I show how the Court's affirmative action decision in
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin6 answers questions about the
constitutionality of disparate impact under the equal protection law of the
Roberts' Court. Fisher holds that before considering the race of individual
applicants for the purpose of achieving diversity in university admissions, a
school must show that that the program is narrowly tailored-that the
school had considered "race-neutral alternatives" and could not achieve
"sufficient diversity without using racial classifications."7 Narrow tailoring
doctrine allows government to act in ways that are race-neutral in form-
that do not classify individuals by race-yet are race conscious in purpose.
The "race-neutral alternative" at issue in Fisher is a program admitting the
top ten percent of students in state high schools to the University of Texas
which the state adopted when the university's original affirmative action
program was struck down in the 90s. The program's supporters understood
that, given the underlying segregation of the state school system, admitting
the top ten percent of high school graduates would increase the racial
diversity of UT's admitted class, and this was a reason they adopted the
program.
As the Court appreciated, the University of Texas considers race when
it admits students through the percent plan, even if the University does not
3. See id at 594 (citing Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)) ("Title VII's
disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the
racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes.
That type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, discriminatory.").
4. See Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
2824 (2013), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013); Magner v. Gallagher, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548
(2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012).
5. See Tex. Dep't. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 747 F.3d 275 (5th
Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-1371). For discussion of the
constitutional avoidance claims in this case, see infra note 85.
6. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
7. Id at 2420. Writing for seven members of the Court, Justice Kennedy reaffirmed that
"[n]arrow tailoring... involves a careful judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve
sufficient diversity without using racial classifications . . . . [S]trict scrutiny [requires] a court to
examine with care, and not defer to, a university's 'serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives."' Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339-40 (2003)). As this statement
of the law illustrates, equal protection law characterizes practices that do not classify individuals by
race as "race neutral."
8. See infra notes 103-106.
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consider the race of individual applicants.9 Justice Ginsburg objects that
this difference in form is a distinction without a difference.'0
But, from a constitutional standpoint, is a difference in form a
distinction without a difference? Is purpose the only factor that matters in
determining the constitutionality of race-conscious state action, or might
the means the state employs to achieve its ends matter as well? In this
Article, I explore what Justice Kennedy's endorsement of narrow tailoring
in the Fisher case suggests about his underlying concerns in Ricci, and ask
how form matters in the debate over disparate impact and in the
architecture of equal protection law in the Roberts' Court.
Part I offers a brief review of disparate impact claims under federal
employment discrimination law. Part II shows that, over the decades,
judicial views about whether disparate impact was required, permitted, or
prohibited by equal protection have evolved with the interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause itself. Part III examines the challenge to disparate
impact first advanced in Ricci. To clarify the constitutional concerns
potentially at stake in Ricci, Part IV situates disparate impact law in the
equal protection doctrine of the Roberts Court, showing how the Court's
recent decision in Fisher undermines the view that disparate impact is
unconstitutional in purpose. Part V then puzzles about the precise locus of
the Court's concern in Ricci, showing how Justice Kennedy responds to
New Haven's procedurally irregular efforts to comply with disparate
impact law in much the way he responds to affirmative action law.
Disparate impact law can promote equal opportunity, increase employee
confidence in the fairness of selection criteria, and so reduce racial
balkanization; but for disparate impact law to do so, Justice Kennedy seems
to be saying in Ricci, disparate impact law needs to be enforced with
attention to all employees' expectations of fair dealing.
I. GRIGGS: DISPARATE IMPACT AS EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
The disparate impact cause of action was first recognized by the
Supreme Court in 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.," and codified by
Congress in the 1991 Civil Rights Act.1 2 Under Title VII, plaintiffs can
challenge facially neutral employment actions with a disparate impact on
one of the Act's protected classes.13 Once the plaintiff shows that some
employment practice causes a disparate impact on minorities or women, the
9. See infra text accompanying notes 104-108.
10. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
11. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).




burden shifts to the employer to show that the challenged practice is
justified by business necessity.14 If the employer makes such a showing, the
practice is lawful, unless the challenging party can show that the employer
has alternative ways to meet its business needs with lesser exclusionary
impact.'5 Courts do not require employers to adopt alternatives that are less
effective or more expensive.'6
Why impose disparate impact liability? Judges and commentators, both
liberal and conservative, understand disparate impact liability to redress at
least three kinds of discrimination that are common in societies that have
recently repudiated centuries old traditions of discrimination.7
The first is covert intentional discrimination. Once a society adopts
laws prohibiting discrimination, discrimination may simply go
underground. When discrimination is hidden, it is hard to prove. Disparate
impact tests probe facially neutral practices to ensure their enforcement
does not mask covert intentional discrimination. 18
The second is implicit or unconscious bias. Discrimination does not
end suddenly; it fades slowly. Even after a society repudiates a system of
formal hierarchy, social scientists have shown that traditional norms
continue to shape judgments in ways that may not be perceptible even to
the decision maker herself.19 Disparate impact tests probe facially neutral
14. Id.
15. Id. at § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (discussing burdens of proof in disparate impact cases).
16. See, e.g., Ernest F. Lidge III, Financial Costs as a Defense to an Employment Discrimination
Claim, 58 ARK. L. REv. 1, 32-38 (2005) (cataloging cases in which courts rejected plaintiffs' less
discriminatory alternatives because of the costs they imposed on employers); Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (O'Connor, J., for the plurality) ("Factors such as the cost or
other burdens of proposed alternative selection devices are relevant in determining whether they would
be equally as effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer's legitimate business goals").
17. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Ricci suggests a fourth purpose for disparate impact liability:
building employee confidence in the fairness of tests, and so avoiding the balkanization of the
workplace. See infra notes 132-141 and accompanying text.
18. In his Ricci concurrence, Justice Scalia suggested that disparate impact law is constitutional
to the extent that it redresses intentional discrimination. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595
(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that disparate impact is constitutional to the extent it is "an
evidentiary tool used to identify genuine, intentional discrimination-to 'smoke out,' as it were,
disparate treatment"). See also In re Emp't Discrimination Litig. Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1322
(11th Cir. 1999) ("[A]lthough the form of the disparate impact inquiry differs from that used in a case
challenging state action directly under the Fourteenth Amendment, the core injury targeted by both
methods of analysis remains the same: intentional discrimination."); Richard Primus, The Future of
Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1376 (2010) (presenting the view of disparate impact law
as "an evidentiary dragnet intended to identify hidden intentional discrimination in the present");
George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory ofDiscrimination, 73 VA.
L. REv. 1297, 1299 (1987) (arguing that like disparate treatment, disparate impact targets "pretextual
discrimination," which is difficult to prove without direct evidence of employer intent).
19. Ample evidence suggests that implicit bias is rampant. For instance, Implicit Association
Tests (IATs), which measure the strength of association between categories uch as Black/White and
Good/Bad by testing the reaction times of participants, have consistently shown that participants prefer
white people and attributes. See Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias
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practices to ensure their enforcement does not reflect implicit bias or
unconscious discrimination.2 0
The third form of bias is sometimes termed structural discrimination.
An employer acting without bias may adopt a standard that has a disparate
impact on groups because the standard selects for traits whose allocation
has been shaped by past discrimination, whether practiced by the employer
or by others with whom the employer is in close dealings.2 1 Disparate
in A Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REv. 1555, 1571-72 (2013) ("Over fourteen million IATs,
measuring various kinds of biases, including bias based on gender, sexuality, and age, have been
completed. Seventy-five percent of those who have taken the race IAT have demonstrated implicit
racial bias in favor of Whites."). Resume studies confirm the pervasiveness of implicit bias. See, e.g.,
Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and
Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. EcON. REV. 991, 998 (2004)
(reporting that applicants with black-identified names had a fifty percent lower callback rate than
applicants with white-identified names when researchers sent out comparable resumes); Corinne A.
Moss-Racusin et al., Science Faculty's Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students, 109 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. SCI. 16474, 16475 (2012) (reporting that both male and female faculty members reviewing
undergraduate applicants for a laboratory manager position, who were randomly assigned either male or
female names, were significantly more likely to rate the male applicant as more competent and more
worthy of being hired and of receiving faculty mentorship and a higher salary). So do studies of the
credit markets, see, e.g., David G. Blanchflower et al., Discrimination in the Small-Business Credit
Market, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 930, 931-32 (2003) (reporting, based on national economic data from
1993 and 1998, that black small-business owners are approximately twice as likely to be denied
business loans than white business owners, even after controlling for differences in creditworthiness),
and criminal prosecutions, see, e.g., BESIKI KUTATELADZE, WHITNEY TYMAS & MARY CROWLEY,
VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, Research Summary: Race and Prosecution in Manhattan 3, 6-7 (July 2014),
available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/race-and-prosecution-
manhattan-summary.pdf (reporting that "race remained a statistically significant independent factor in
most of the discretion points that were examined as part of the research" and that black defendants were
more likely to receive a sentence offer including a jail or prison term and be sentenced to imprisonment
than similarly situated Whites and Asians). See generally Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through
Colorblindess: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010) (discussing research on
implicit bias and identifying institutional contexts in which interventions might be effective).
20. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (explaining that
disparate impact liability is important because "even if one assumed that [intentional] discrimination
can be adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis, the problem of subconscious
stereotypes and prejudices would remain"); Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161,
1164 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The concept of disparate impact was developed for the purpose of identifying
situations where, through inertia or insensitivity, companies were following policies that gratuitously-
needlessly-although not necessarily deliberately, excluded black or female workers from equal
employment opportunities."); Kenneth L. Marcus, The War Between Disparate Impact and Equal
Protection, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 53, 78 ("The core purpose of the disparate-impact provision is
the government's compelling interest to identify and eliminate intentional or unconscious
discrimination that cannot be proved through the disparate-treatment provision."); Richard A. Primus,
Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARv. L. REV. 493, 532-36 (2003)
(analyzing this justification); Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
2157, 2159-60 (2013) (arguing that disparate impact law targets unconscious, implicit discrimination
that is beyond the reach of disparate treatment law).
21. Structural discrimination, for instance, is at work where a city hiring prime contractors is
concerned that prime contractors have systematically excluded minority sub-contractors from bid
opportunities or trade organizations. Cf City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509
(1989) (plurality opinion) (noting that under such circumstances a "city could act to dismantle the
closed business system by taking appropriate measures against those who discriminate on the basis of
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impact tests probe facially neutral practices to ensure their enforcement
does not unnecessarily perpetuate the effects of past intentional
discrimination.
Where disparate impact is used to ensure that job requirements are in
fact job related-that requirements reflect the functional needs of the job,
rather than hidden intentional discrimination, unconscious discrimination,
or the legacy of past discrimination-disparate impact promotes equal
opportunity. This is the argument of the Court's 1971 opinion in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. 2 2 recognizing disparate impact liability under Title VII. 2 3
In Griggs, the employer had openly discriminated before the effective
date of Title VII; after the effective date of Title VII, the company dropped
race from its job descriptions and required a standardized test and high
school degree for new hires or transfers, but did not require current
employees to meet these new standards for employment.24 The test and
degree requirements had a disparate impact on minority applicants.25 In
allowing plaintiffs to challenge the employer's job requirements on
grounds of disparate racial impact rather than intent, the Supreme Court
emphasized the recent segregation of the North Carolina public schools.26
Not only Duke Power Company but the institutions from which it was
drawing its labor force had openly discriminated.27 The Court allowed
plaintiffs to challenge job requirements with an exclusionary impact to
ensure that the requirements did not unnecessarily entrench the legacy of
prior discrimination: "Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices."28 Employers were entitled to retain job requirements with racial
disparate impact, but only so long as the employer could show the
race or other illegitimate criteria," but determining that the city had not adequately shown these
circumstances existed).
22. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
23. For a history of the litigation, see ROBERT BELTON, THE CRUSADE FOR EQUALITY IN THE
WORKPLACE: THE GRIGGs V. DUKE POWER STORY (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 2014).
24. Specifically, prior to 1965, the company expressly limited black employees to serving in one
of its five departments-the labor department, whose positions all paid less than the lowest paid
positions in the other four departments. In 1965, in order to qualify for a transfer from the labor
department to the higher paying departments, employees were required to have a high school degree, or
if they lacked that, to have passed two standardized tests. New employees seeking placement outside
the labor department needed to have graduated and passed the two exams. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426-28.
See also BELTON, supra note 20, at 135.
25. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 ("[B]oth requirements operate to disqualify Negroes at a
substantially higher rate than white applicants . . . .").
26. Id. at 430 ("Because they are Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education in
segregated schools .... .").
27. See id. at 430 (citing Gaston Cnty. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 291-92 (1969)).
28. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
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requirements were functionally related to the job the employer needs done:
"The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited."2 9 Courts interpret business
necessity flexibly, with attention to employer needs.
Griggs presents disparate impact liability as vindicating equality of
opportunity. As Griggs illustrates, probing qualifications with a racial
disparate impact ensures they do not mask hidden and unconscious
discrimination, and so "operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices."31 Job qualifications with a racial
disparate impact that do not serve the functional needs of the employer can
create a de facto preference for majority employees; by contrast, the Court
observes, striking down job requirements that do serve the functional needs
of the employer would create a preference for minority employees.32
Griggs charts a course between these two alternatives. Chief Justice Burger
concludes his opinion for a unanimous Court: "Congress has not
commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified
simply because of minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifications
as such, Congress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so
that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant."33 The Court
understands the framework it set forth in Griggs as ensuring that
qualifications "measure the person for the job," 34 and so creating a merits-
based, race-neutral baseline for the selection of employees.
II. DISPARATE IMPACT: A SHORT CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
To this point we have considered the logic and purposes of disparate
impact standards in federal employment discrimination law. I now begin to
examine disparate impact's relation to the Equal Protection Clause.
Appreciating how the relation of disparate impact and equal protection has
evolved over the decades helps clarify disparate impact's status in the equal
protection jurisprudence of the Roberts Court.
As we will see, in the 1970s when Griggs was decided, many federal
judges thought inquiry into the racial disparate impact of state action was
29. Id. at 431.
30. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
31. Id. at 429-30.
32. Id. at 430-31.
33. Id. at 436. See also id at 430-31 ("[T]he Act does not command that any person be hired
simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority
group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what
Congress has proscribed.").
34. Id. at 436.
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constitutionally required under the Equal Protection Clause; but the
Supreme Court instead held that inquiry into disparate impact was
constitutionally permitted. This understanding endured for decades until the
litigation in Ricci put in issue whether equal protection might prohibit
inquiry into disparate impact.35
In 1971, when the Burger Court recognized the disparate impact cause
of action under Title VII in Griggs, there was no clear distinction between
statutory and constitutional equality standards. In this period, many federal
courts thought that inquiry into state action with a racial disparate impact
was required by the Equal Protection Clause.3 6 Federal courts commonly
looked to foreseeable disparate impact as evidence of unconstitutional
purpose." And some courts went further, holding that state action with
racial disparate impact violated equal protection unless justified by a
sufficiently compelling state interest.38 Reasoning in this way, many courts
of appeal applied Griggs in equal protection employment discrimination
cases arising before Title VII was extended to public employers.39
In an appeal from one such ruling, the Court announced in Washington
v. Davis4 0 that to make out a constitutional violation, plaintiffs would have
to prove more than racial disparate impact; equal protection plaintiffs
would now have to prove discriminatory purpose.4 1 In rejecting the many
decisions that enforced disparate impact as a constitutional standard, the
Davis Court noted that facially neutral legislation provides equal
treatment;42 it then proceeded to discuss institutional considerations at
35. See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court 2012 Term-Foreword: Equality Divided, 127
HARV. L. REv 1, 11-23, 51-58 (2013) (charting this history).
36. Id. at 12-15.
37. For example, some courts of appeals inferred the "segregative intent" necessary to make out
an equal protection violation per Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 206 (1973), from the
foreseeable effects of districting decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Sch. Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 535-36
(8th Cir. 1975) ("[A] presumption of segregative intent arises once it is established that school
authorities have engaged in acts or omissions, the natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of
which is to bring about or maintain segregation.").
38. See, e.g., Baker v. Columbus Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 1112, 1114 (5th Cir. 1972)
("Whenever the effect of a law or policy produces such a racial distortion it is subject to strict
scrutiny. . . . In order to withstand an equal protection attack it must be justified by an overriding
purpose independent of its racial effects.").
39. See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732 (1st Cir. 1972) ("The public employer must,
we think, in order to justify the use of a means of selection shown to have a racially disproportionate
impact, demonstrate that the means is in fact substantially related to job performance."). In Washington
v. Davis, the Court cited five decisions of courts of appeals following this approach. 426 U.S. 229, 244
n.12 (1976).
40. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
41. Seeidat239.
42. See id. at 245 (noting "difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral
qualification for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory and denies 'any person .. . equal
2015] 661
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length, worrying about the "far-reaching" consequences of involving
federal courts in sorting through disparate impact challenges to facially
neutral legislation.43 Davis held that federal courts lacked authority to
impose disparate impact liability directly under the Constitution, and
should wait for guidance from the legislature. The Court's opinion in
Washington v. Davis concludes: "[I]n our view, extension of the [disparate
impact] rule beyond those areas where it is already applicable by reason of
statute, such as in the field of public employment, should await legislative
prescription."44 Davis, in other words, held that inquiry into disparate
impact was not required, but permitted by constitutional guarantees of
equality.
Emphasizing the democratic deficit of federal courts, the Burger Court
began differentiating constitutional and statutory frameworks, first holding
in Davis itself that in constitutional cases plaintiffs would have to prove
discriminatory purpose, and then, several years later, holding in Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney45 that to prove discriminatory
purpose, equal protection plaintiffs would have to show that the challenged
action was undertaken at least in part because of, and not merely in spite of,
its impact on a protected class.46 Feeney vastly restricted the role that
evidence of foreseeable disparate impact could play in proving
discriminatory purpose in equal protection cases.4 7 The Burger Court
narrowed liability for discriminatory purpose arising under the judicially
enforceable provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment on the view that it
protection of the laws' simply because a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify than members of
other racial or ethnic groups.").
43. The Court justified its decision by appealing to differences between standards that Congress
might provide under Title VII and those the Court might impose under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments, observing that the disparate impact inquiry "involves a more probing judicial review of,
and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is appropriate
under the Constitution where special racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed." Id. at
247.
44. Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
45. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
46. Id. at 279.
47. Federal courts have regularly invoked Feeney in order to reject claims of discriminatory
purpose, for instance, with respect to the death penalty, see, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
298 (1987) ("For this claim to prevail, McCleskey would have to prove that the Georgia Legislature
enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an anticipated racially discriminatory
effect.") (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279), and federal sentencing guidelines, see, e.g., United States v.
Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2013) ("The [Defendants] and [a dissenting judge] add that
Congress must have foreseen that its failure to make the Fair Sentencing Act fully retroactive would
have a racially disproportionate impact.... [But] [n]o evidence exists that Congress refused to make
the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive because this refusal would disproportionately harm black
Defendants.") (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279)).
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was the prerogative of representative government to lead the nation beyond
the legacy of segregation.48
As constitutional and statutory standards diverged, the importance of
statutory antidiscrimination standards grew, as did the ferocity of
conservative attacks on disparate impact law. The Burger Court had
justified disparate impact as securing equality of opportunity; but by the
1980s, critics of disparate impact in and allied with the Reagan
administration increasingly attacked the framework, arguing that it did not
protect equality of opportunity but instead protected "equality of results"A9
For example, in opposing 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act,
Professor James Blumstein characterized disparate impact rules, or
"substantive effects standards," as a "means to the end of equal political
and economic status for blacks and whites as groups," contending that
"[e]quality of end result replaces equality of opportunity as the yardstick
,,50for measuring civil rights progress.
Did disparate impact law even the playing field, or tilt it? This
emergent debate about baselines reflected differences in what I call "racial
common sense"-assumptions about race that implicitly or explicitly guide
understanding of everyday life. Was persisting racial stratification in the
workplace likely the product of past and present bias, or was it more likely
attributable to differences in racial group tastes and talents?5' For those
who believed that past and present bias continued to play a role in shaping
the workplace, disparate impact was an important tool for uncovering
hidden and hard to prove intentional and unconscious discrimination, and
for ensuring that workplace standards did not unnecessarily perpetuate the
48. See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court 2012 Term-Foreword: Equality Divided, 127
HARV. L. REv. 1, 20 ("The Burger Court repeatedly explained that it was for representative
government, and not the federal courts, to guide the nation beyond the legacies of segregation. These
institutional concerns, sounding in separation of powers and federalism, supply the central justification
for the Court's decision to restrict the scope of the judicially enforceable Equal Protection Clause in
constitutional challenges to facially neutral statutes with racial disparate impact."); see also id at 20-
23.
49. See, e.g., Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99
HARV. L. REv. 1312, 1312-13 (1986) (criticizing affirmative action, disparate impact liability, and
similar measures for promoting "equality of results" over "equality of opportunity") (emphasis in
original). Abram was appointed by President Reagan to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. See Juan
Williams, Rights Panel Backs Reagan in Opposing Quotas, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1984, at Al
(discussing Abram, vice chairman of the commission, as a Reagan appointee).
50. James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the
Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 633, 650-51 (1983).
51. Then-chair of the EEOC, Clarence Thomas, believed it was the latter. See Robert Pear,
Changes Weighed in Federal Rules on Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1984, at Al (quoting
Thomas as saying that "[e]very time there is a statistical disparity, it is presumed there is
discrimination," when in fact that disparity is often the result of non-discriminatory factors like culture,
education, and "previous events"). For an example of similar reasoning in a publication of the Reagan
Justice Department, see infra note 53.
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legacy of past discrimination. As Griggs showed, the disparate impact
inquiry could ensure that workplace standards actually reflected the skills
needed to do the job, and so reinforce merit-based hiring and promote
equality of opportunity. But for those who viewed the persisting
stratification of the workplace as best explained by racial group differences
in taste and talent, as Thomas Sowell and many in the Reagan
administration argued,52 the disparate impact framework was not correcting
bias, but instead introducing it. They saw disparate impact as akin to
affirmative actions3  or a "quota,"54  an illegitimate form of group
preference.s
In 1989, the year that a majority of the Rehnquist Court first applied
strict scrutiny to affirmative action in Croson,6 this same block of Justices
changed the burdens of proof in Title VII disparate impact cases in a
decision called Wards Cove." Congressional efforts to reverse Wards Cove
and codify the disparate impact framework provoked a fierce several year
struggle, with opponents decrying the legislation restoring disparate impact
as a "quota bill."5 8 Yet, strikingly, the conflict was legislative; opponents of
52. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL: REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION: "DISPARATE IMPACT" AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 6 n.17 (1987) [hereinafter OLP, REDEFINING RACE] (citing THOMAS SOWELL,
CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 42-43 (1984)); see also Abram, supra note 49, at 1316 & n. 11
(citing THOMAS SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
190 (1983)).
53. See generally OLP, REDEFINING RACE, supra note 52, at i ("[I]f 'discrimination' is
understood to mean statistically disproportionate effects alone, the result will be nothing less than the
permanent institutionalization of race- and gender-conscious affirmative action. The report suggests that
such a result follows unavoidably from the naturally occurring statistical disparities between groups that
are inevitable in a heterogeneous ociety such as the United States.").
54. Memorandum from John Roberts, Special Assistant to the Att'y Gen., to the Att'y Gen.,
Talking Points for White House Meeting on Voting Rights Act (Jan. 26, 1982), available at
http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-89-0372/docO56.pdf ("An effects test for § 2
could ... lead to a quota system in electoral politics . ... Just as we oppose quotas in employment and
education, so too we oppose them in elections.").
55. For a closer look at debate over disparate impact in this period, see Siegel, supra note 48, at
23-29.
56. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
57. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Justice Stevens concurred in the
judgment in Croson, and signed on to parts of Justice O'Connor's opinion, but dissented in Wards
Cove. The remaining members of the majorities are the same in both cases: Justices O'Connor, White,
Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy. Compare Croson, 488 U.S. at 475, with Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 644.
58. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill," a Codification
of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All ofthe Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 287 (1993).
For an analysis of the debate, see Robin Stryker, Martha Scarpellino & Mellisa Holtzman, Political
Culture Wars 1990s Style: The Drum Beat of Quotas in Media Framing of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
17 RES. SOC. STRATIFICATION & MOBILITY 33 (1999).
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the 1991 Civil Rights Act never questioned its constitutionality.59 Debate
over disparate impact persisted in different legislative arenas.60
III. Ricci: DISPARATE IMPACT AS DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE?
It was not until the Ricci case in 2009 that conflict over disparate
impact took constitutional form.6' The suit came after decades of litigation
between white and minority groups over minority access to the firefighting
jobs in New Haven, Connecticut.62 In 2003, New Haven administered a
written civil service exam to identify candidates for officer positions in the
department, and received information from the company charged with
scoring the results that no black candidates scored high enough to be
considered for promotion.6 3 When New Haven announced that the results
of a written exam would result in the promotion of scarcely any minority
firefighters," the minority firefighters reacted with distrust. They suspected
bias and, in a civil service board hearing, raised disparate impact
concerns.6 1 In response, the City announced it would void the results of the
test, and retest the applicants using a new promotion exam.66 White
59. For instance, in an important report issued by the Department of Justice during President
Reagan's tenure, administration lawyers sharply criticized disparate impact liability, but did not
consider the possibility that the Constitution prohibited disparate impact liability. See OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
YEAR 2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1988). See also H.R. REP. NO.
102-40, at 52-81, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 737-36 (criticizing bill without raising
constitutional objections).
60. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that there is no private right
of action to enforce disparate impact claims under Title VI regulations, but raising no issue concerning
the constitutionality of disparate impact).
61. Professor Richard Primus seems first to have raised the question of disparate impact's
constitutionality in 2003. As he observed, "[t]he idea that equal protection might affirmatively prohibit
the use of statutory disparate impact standards departs significantly from settled ways of thinking about
antidiscrimination law." Primus, supra note 18, at 495. He attributed the plausibility of his
constitutional challenge of disparate impact to changes in equal protection law since the 1970s that
evince hostility to government action that "aims to allocate goods among racial groups, even when
intended to redress past discrimination." Id. at 496.
62. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 610-11 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Reva B.
Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality
Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1324-25, 1338-40 (2011).
63. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 566. Of the 118 candidates who took either the lieutenant or captain
examination-68 whites, 27 blacks, and 23 Hispanics-41 whites, 9 blacks, and 6 Hispanics passed. Id.
Because the city's charter mandated that each vacancy must be filled by one candidate from the highest
three scorers, 19 candidates were eligible for promotion to lieutenant or captain-17 whites, 2
Hispanics, and no blacks. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 562.
66. Id.
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firefighters brought suit,6 7 raising both constitutional and statutory claims,
and ultimately persuaded the Supreme Court that New Haven's decision to
rescind the test results violated meritocratic standards, and amounted to
unlawful disparate treatment on the basis of race.68
Writing for the majority in Ricci, Justice Kennedy announced that the
Court could decide the case under the federal employment discrimination
statute and so avoid the equal protection claim.6 9 Yet even as the Court
professed to "avoid" the constitutional question, its decision under Title VII
suggested that New Haven's enforcement of disparate impact might raise
equal protection concerns. Justice Kennedy held that, in voiding the exam
and announcing that it would retest applicants for promotion, New Haven
engaged in disparate treatment in violation of Title VII: "the City rejected
the test results because 'too many whites and not enough minorities would
be promoted were the lists to be certified.'"7 0 "Whatever the City's ultimate
aim-however well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed-the
City made its employment decision because of race. The City rejected the
test results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white."7t
The Court did not find that New Haven acted with unconstitutional
purpose, yet it did find that, in rejecting the test results, New Haven
violated Title VII's prohibition on disparate treatment.72 To do so, the
Court introduced into Title VII a new standard not mentioned in the 1991
Act, drawn from its equal protection-affirmative action decisions. The
majority ruled that, henceforth, employers would have to show that they
had "a strong basis in evidence" for believing they might be in violation of
disparate impact law before they could take an adverse employment action
67. Id. at 574 ("The plaintiffs ... are 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed
the examinations but were denied a chance at promotions when the CSB refused to certify the test
results.").
68. The plaintiffs in Ricci situated their constitutional argument in the Court's discriminatory
purposes cases, arguing that "race was the 'predominant factor' in their refusal to promote petitioners."
Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 21-25, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428, 08-
328) (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) (plurality opinion)); id. at 24-25 (citing Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977), Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), and redistricting cases).
Plaintiffs also argued: "Strict scrutiny applies fully to race-based actions taken out of a
professed desire to advantage or remedy past harms to minorities." Id. at 22. They never clarified what
they meant by "race-based actions," a term that might have indicated purpose or classification. Further
blending the lines of doctrine together, the plaintiffs cited Adarand for the proposition that a benign
motive does not protect a racial classification from scrutiny and invoked it to say they do not need to
make a showing of Feeney-style animus. See id at 26-27.
69. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 593.
70. Id. at 579 (citations omitted); id. (quoting the district court's opinion noting that
"respondents' 'own arguments . .. show that the City's reasons for advocating non-certification were
related to the racial distribution of the results').
71. Id. at 579-80 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 593.
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otherwise amounting to disparate treatment to comply with the statute's
disparate impact provisions.n
Justice Scalia went further. Instead of questioning New Haven's action
in complying with Title VII, he challenged the disparate impact provisions
of the 1991 Civil Rights Act on their face, suggesting they might be
unconstitutional. Warning of a coming "war between disparate impact and
equal protection,"74 Justice Scalia cited Feeney, the equal protection
discriminatory purpose decision, and observed: "Title VII's disparate-
impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring
employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make
decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial
decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, discriminatory."75 The statute did
not impose quotas, Justice Scalia argued, but it imposed pressure on
employers to design the workplace with attention to racial outcomes.76 The
fact that the government's purpose was benign should make no difference,
he contended, citing Adarand,77 an affirmative action case, for the
proposition that "the purportedly benign motive for the disparate-impact
provisions cannot save the statute."78 "Intentional discrimination is still
occurring, just one step up the chain. Government compulsion of such
design would therefore seemingly violate equal protection principles."
The only justification for disparate impact liability that Justice Scalia
recognized as weighty enough to save the law's constitutionality was that
disparate impact liability might police for intentional discrimination.80
Ricci has encouraged a stream of conservative challenges to disparate
impact, in which the Court has expressed interest. Since its decision in
Ricci, the Court has twice taken cases questioning whether the Fair
Housing Act provides a disparate impact cause of action 8'-statutory cases
73. Id. at 583 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)).
74. Id. at 595.
75. Id. at 594.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 595 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 594-95.
80. Id. at 595 ("It is one thing to free plaintiffs from proving an employer's illicit intent, but quite
another to preclude the employer from proving that its motives were pure and its actions reasonable.").
81. Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
2824 (2013), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013); Magner v. Gallagher, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548
(2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012). Each case raised the question whether the Fair Housing
Act was properly interpreted to authorize disparate impact claims-a question all courts of appeals that
have considered the matter have answered in the affirmative. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.
v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 381-84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing decisions from each circuit except
the Fourth Circuit), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013).
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that also raised constitutional challenges to disparate impact, in the form of
constitutional avoidance claims,82 and in briefs of amici;" in each case the
parties settled just before the Court was to hear argument in the case.84 This
Term the Court has again taken a fair housing disparate impact case in
which the defendant invokes Justice Scalia's opinion in Ricci to support
. . .85similar constitutional avoidance claims.
IV. FISHER: HOW AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OPINION CHANGES THE
DEBATE OVER DISPARATE IMPACT
Congress's decision to codify the disparate impact test in the 1991
Civil Rights Act may have been intentional and race conscious, but was
Congress's decision to codify the disparate impact cause of action itself a
82. See, e.g., Petitioners' Opening Brief at 40, Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens
in Action, Inc., cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (No. II-
1507) ("[E]xposing the Township and other local governments to disparate-impact claims for otherwise
neutral land-use decisions would affirmatively require them to 'classify individuals by race and allocate
benefits and burdens on that basis."' (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 551 U.S. 701, 783 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
83. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation et. al. in Support of Petitioners at
5, Magner v. Gallagher, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012)
(No. 10-1032) ("Subjecting government defendants to disparate impact claims leads them to engage in
unconstitutional race-conscious decisionmaking to avoid liability for such claims.").
84. Adam Liptak, Fair-Housing Case Is Settled Before It Reaches Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/us/fair-housing-case-is-settled-before-it-reaches-
supreme-court.html.
85. See Tex. Dep't. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 747 F.3d 275
(5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-1371). While all courts of
appeals to consider the question have recognized a disparate impact cause of action under the Fair
Housing Act, see supra note 81, the State of Texas argues that the Court should reject that interpretation
of the statute in order to avoid the conflict with equal protection that, it asserts, would result. See Brief
for the Petitioners at 43, Tex. Dep't. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. 46 (No. 13-1371) (Nov. 17,
2014) (arguing that HUD's disparate-impact rule "effectively compel[s] entities to engage in race-
conscious decisionmaking in order to avoid legal liability" (citing Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580-84; id. at 594
(Scalia, J. concurring) ("Title VII's disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often
requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on
(because of) those racial outcomes"))); id at 43-44 ("This is not acceptable under modem equal-
protection doctrine, which requires colorblind government and abhors government decisionmaking
based on race."); id. at 44 (claiming that "HUD's 'disparate impact' regime will compel every regulated
entity to evaluate the racial outcomes of its policies and make race-based decisions to avoid disparate-
impact liability" and arguing that "[t]he Constitution does not permit state actors to engage in racial
balancing of this sort" (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003))). For similar claims by
amici, see, for example, Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation et al. in Support of
Petitioners at 21, 24, Tex. Dep't. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. 46 (No. 13-1371) (Nov. 24, 2014)
(also invoking Justice Scalia's concurrence in Ricci and arguing that "the Court was 'merely postponing
the evil day' when the Court must decide 'whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact
provisions ... consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection' given that "disparate
impact doctrine requires states to 'place a racial thumb on the scales, . . . evaluate the racial outcomes of
[their] policies, and .. .make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes"' (quoting Ricci,
557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J. concurring))).
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discriminatory purpose, an action in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause?86 As I will now show, Justice Scalia's suggestion that Congress's
decision to codify disparate impact liability reflects a discriminatory
purpose is at odds with equal protection precedents that allow, and even
encourage, race-conscious but facially neutral state action that promotes
equal opportunity or diversity. This understanding of equal protection law
is assumed and confirmed by Justice Kennedy's recent opinion in Fisher v.
University of Texas. Fisher poses a massive obstacle to Justice Scalia's
claim that disparate impact law reflects a discriminatory purpose. Only
after appreciating the obstacles to this broad facial challenge to disparate
impact law can we isolate with greater precision the kind of constitutional
concerns that so disturb the majority of the Court in Ricci.
A. Disparate Impact under the Equal Protection Law of the Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts
Numerous decisions of the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts
support the constitutionality of disparate impact standards:
(1) Washington v. Davis, which establishes modern discriminatory
purpose law, holds that legislatures have authority to adopt
disparate impact laws, even if the judicially enforced Equal
Protection Clause does not require such an inquiry.
(2) The Davis line of cases defines discriminatory purpose in
terms having nothing to do with the kinds of race
consciousness that disparate impact law reflects. To make out a
claim of discriminatory purpose under the Equal Protection
Clause, plaintiffs have to show that government has acted with
animus, malice, or intent to harm. "'Discriminatory purpose,'"1
the Court explained in Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney," "implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that
the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because
of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group."89
86. A different way of framing this question might be to ask whether under the equal protection
cases of the Roberts Court disparate impact embodies an unconstitutional "racially allocative" purpose.
Cf Primus, supra note 18, at 1341-48; Primus, supra note 20, at 494-99.
87. Supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
88. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
89. Id. at 279 (citation omitted).
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(3) Modem strict scrutiny law repeatedly affirms that government
can act for benign race-conscious reasons that do not amount to
discriminatory purposes within the meaning of Feeney. To
adopt an affirmative action program that classifies by race,
government has to show that the program is narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling government end that government
could not achieve by alternative race-neutral means.90 The
doctrine of narrow tailoring allows, and even encourages,
government to pursue the race-conscious end of diversity or
equality of opportunity by means that do not classify
individuals by race.91 A majority of the Court-including
Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia-signed on to this narrow
tailoring requirement in Croson,92  and Justice O'Connor
writing for the Court repeated it again in Grutter.93 In this body
of law, form matters.
(4) Reiterating the principles structuring the affirmative action
cases, Justice Kennedy went out of his way in Parents
Involvect4 to emphasize that race-conscious chool districting
to promote equal opportunity was permissible and would not
trigger strict scrutiny, in the ways that classifying individual
students by race does.95 As he explained: "If school authorities
are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain
schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal
90. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
91. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013) ("Narrow
tailoring .... involves a careful judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve sufficient
diversity without using racial classifications.") (citation omitted).
92. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (describing the "race-
neutral means to increase minority business participation" that the city could have pursued in lieu of a
racial quota, such as favoring small businesses generally and lowering bond requirements); id. at 526
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("A State can, of course, act 'to undo the effects of past
discrimination' in many permissible ways that do not involve classification by race. . . . Such programs
may well have racially disproportionate impact, but they are not based on race."); see also id. at 528
("Since blacks have been disproportionately disadvantaged by racial discrimination, any race-neutral
remedial program aimed at the disadvantaged as such will have a disproportionately beneficial impact
on blacks. Only such a program, and not one that operates on the basis of race, is in accord with the
letter and the spirit of our Constitution.").
93. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) ("Narrow tailoring does, however, require
serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the
university seeks.").
94. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
95. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy objected to the strict colorblindness that Chief Justice
Roberts insisted on his majority opinion. Id at 788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). Instead, he argued that the government could legitimately take steps to consider and
alter the racial composition of schools in order to promote diversity in the student body and equal
opportunity for minority students. Id.
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educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free to
devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a
general way and without treating each student in different
fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by
race."96 Race-conscious districting, he emphasized, was only
one instance of many race-conscious but facially neutral forms
of state action the government could employ to increase
diversity and to promote equal opportunity.97 Justice Kennedy
explained: "These mechanisms are race-conscious but do not
lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells
each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely
any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found
permissible."98
In these passages of Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy reaffirms the
principle on which the narrow tailoring cases rest. Not all race-conscious
purposes are discriminatory purposes within the meaning of Davis-Feeney;
government may engage in race-conscious state action to remedy past
discrimination, promote equal opportunity, and achieve diversity, in cases
where the law is facially neutral in form. This is not a bug, but a feature of
equal protection law. It reflects the understanding that prohibiting de jure
segregation was not enough to end discrimination and its legacies;
baselines in the United States are still not race neutral.99 As Justice
Kennedy explained in Parents Involved:
Today we enjoy a society that is remarkable in its openness and
opportunity. Yet our tradition is to go beyond present
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. The passage in full reads:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and
races through other means, including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing
attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and
tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race. These mechanisms are race
conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each
student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict
scrutiny to be found permissible. Executive and legislative branches, which for generations
now have considered these types of policies and procedures, should be permitted to employ
them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional violation does not occur
whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach might have on students of
different races. Assigning to each student a personal designation according to a crude system
of individual racial classifications is quite a different matter; and the legal analysis changes
accordingly.
Id. at 789 (citations omitted).
99. See, e.g., id. at 787-88.
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achievements, however significant, and to recognize and confront
the flaws and injustices that remain. This is especially true when
we seek assurance that opportunity is not denied on account of
race. The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality
is that too often it does.
The statement by Justice Harlan that "[o]ur Constitution is color-
blind" was most certainly justified in the context of his dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson. The Court's decision in that case was a
grievous error it took far too long to overrule.... [A]s an
aspiration, Justice Harlan's axiom must command our assent. In the
real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal
constitutional principle.00
B. Fisher and Disparate Impact
Fisher's ruling on affirmative action reflects and affirms these equal
protection principles of the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts. The
case provides a concrete illustration of the principle that government may
pursue certain race-conscious purposes when it acts by facially neutral
means. More particularly, the case illustrates (1) that government may act
for the race-conscious end of promoting diversity and equality of
opportunity if it acts by facially neutral means, (2) even if government acts
with the specific end of altering racial outcomes (3) in a competitive
process.
100. Id at 787-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis
added) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)). For another example of Justice Kennedy
discussing similar themes, see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995) ("The [Voting Rights] Act,
and its grant of authority to the federal courts to uncover official efforts to abridge minorities' right to
vote, has been of vital importance in eradicating invidious discrimination from the electoral process and
enhancing the legitimacy of our political institutions. Only if our political system and our society
cleanse themselves of that discrimination will all members of the polity share an equal opportunity to
gain public office regardless of race. As a Nation we share both the obligation and the aspiration of
working toward this end. The end is neither assured nor well served, however, by carving electorates
into racial blocs."). Justice O'Connor also recognized the persistence of discrimination and its effects.
See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 992 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The results test of § 2 is
an important part of the apparatus chosen by Congress to effectuate this Nation's commitment 'to
confront its conscience and fulfill the guarantee of the Constitution' with respect to equality in voting.
Congress considered the test 'necessary and appropriate to ensure full protection of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments rights.' It believed that without the results test, nothing could be done about
'overwhelming evidence of unequal access to the electoral system,' or about 'voting practices and
procedures [that] perpetuate the effects of past purposeful discrimination.' And it founded those beliefs
on the sad reality that 'there still are some communities in our Nation where racial politics do dominate
the electoral process.' Respect for those legislative conclusions mandates that the § 2 results test be
accepted and applied unless and until current lower court precedent is reversed and it is held
unconstitutional.") (citations omitted).
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The question in Fisher was whether the University of Texas at Austin
could consider race in individual admissions decisions when the University
also relied on race-neutral means to achieve diversity in its student body.
This inquiry was mandated by narrow tailoring, which Fisher explains
"involves a careful judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve
sufficient diversity without using racial classifications.",0 ' The alternative
race-neutral" means of achieving diversity at issue in Fisher was a
"percent plan," a program admitting the top ten percent of students in state
high schools to the University of Texas at Austin that was enacted when the
state's original affirmative action program was struck down in the 90s.102
The state legislature understood that, given the underlying segregation of
the state school system, admitting the top ten percent of high school
graduates would increase the number of minorities in UT's admitted class;
that was one important reason that UT adopted the program.0o3
There is no chance that the Court overlooked the race-conscious aims
of the percent program. Increasing minority enrollment was repeatedly
described as a purpose"4 of the percent plan in the Fisher litigation. The
Fifth Circuit explained: "The Top Ten Percent Law did not by its terms
admit students on the basis of race, but underrepresented minorities were
its announced target and their admission a large, if not primary,
101. See id. at 2420 ("Narrow tailoring also requires that the reviewing court verify that it is
'necessary' for a university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity. This involves a
careful judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial
classifications.") (citations omitted).
102. In 1996, the Fifth Circuit invalidated the university's process for evaluating applicants
because it considered race but did not serve a compelling governmental interest. See id at 2415 (citing
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 955 (5th Cir. 1996)).
103. See id. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing an analysis of the bill prepared by the
state's House Research Organization, which read, "Many regions of the state, school districts, and high
schools in Texas are still predominantly composed of people from a single racial or ethnic group.
Because of the persistence of this segregation, admitting the top 10 percent of all high schools would
provide a diverse population and ensure that a large, well qualified pool of minority students was
admitted to Texas universities.").
104. Importantly, this was not the only purpose of the percent plan. Even Abigail Fisher
acknowledged that the goal of the percent plan was "two-fold": ensuring a pool of highly qualified
students and promoting diversity. Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Fisher v. Texas, 556 F. Supp.
2d 603 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (No. A-08-CA-263-SS), aff'd sub nom. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); see also STATE OF TEX.
H. RESEARCH ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, HB 588, at 4 (1997), available at
http://www.1rl.state.tx.us/scanned/hroBillAnalyses/75-0/HB588.pdf. ("Admitting the top 10 percent of
high school classes would ensure a highly qualified pool of students each year in the state's higher
education system."). Indeed, the supporters of the bill argued that in addition to improving minority
enrollment the percent plan would improve socioeconomic diversity: "This strategy would not only
assist minority students to whom affirmative action programs were previously targeted but also
similarly deserving Anglo students." Id. at 5.
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purpose."'0 5 In its brief to the Supreme Court, the University of Texas
explained: "An acknowledged purpose of the law was to increase minority
admissions given the loss of race-conscious admissions.',0o In Gratz and
again in her Fisher dissent, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the percent
plan has a purpose of increasing minority enrollment, notwithstanding the
law's facial neutrality 0 7-a point emphasized by the plan's constitutional
critics.,os
No Justice raised questions about the constitutionality of the percent
plan. The Court's acceptance of the percent plan illustrates that government
may act in race-conscious but facially neutral ways to promote equal
opportunity, even where government seeks to alter racial outcomes. Texas
decided to adopt the percent plan with a race-conscious aim of altering the
mix of students the university admitted, and with the plan admitted a
different group of minority and majority applicants than had been admitted
under the old criteria.'09 The doctrine of narrow tailoring sanctions the use
of race-conscious but facially neutral programs to increase diversity, so
long as the program does not discriminate among individual applicants by
race."0 The same can be said about a government's decision to change
school district lines in the ways Justice Kennedy described in Parents
105. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 224 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded,
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). See also id. at 242 ("The Top Ten Percent Law was adopted to increase
minority enrollment.").
106. Brief for Respondents at 8, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No.
11-345) ("The Texas Legislature responded to Hopwoodby enacting the top 10% law (House Bill 588),
which guarantees admission to UT to any graduate of a Texas high school who is ranked in the top 10%
of his or her high school class, beginning with the 1998 admissions cycle. An acknowledged purpose of
the law was to increase minority admissions given the loss of race-conscious admissions.") (citations
omitted)).
107. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Calling
such 10% or 20% plans 'race-neutral' seems to me disingenuous, for they 'unquestionably were
adopted with the specific purpose of increasing representation of African-Americans and Hispanics in
the public higher education system."') (citing Brief for Respondent Bollinger et al. at 44); Fisher, 133
S. Ct. 2411 at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[O]nly an ostrich could regard the supposedly [race]
neutral alternatives as race unconscious.").
108. Regarding the Ten Percent Plan: Hearing Before the Tex. S Subcomm. on Higher Educ. 4-
5, 2004 Leg. ("When the Texas Legislature designed the Ten Percent Plan, it did so with the purposeful
intent of increasing the amount of certain minority students" at the university) (testimony of Roger
Clegg, V.P. and Gen. Counsel, Ctr. for Equal Opportunity), available at
http://198.173.245.213/pdfs/Texastestimony.pdf; id. at 5 (describing the percent plan as a deliberate
effort to boost minority representation after the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood invalidated the express
consideration of race in admissions); Marcus, supra note 20, at 73 ("Under Ricci and Parents Involved,
the Ten Percent Plan should trigger strict scrutiny to the extent that Texas's racial motivations
predominated in the institution of the plan.").
109. Cf Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 645 (5th Cir. 2014) ("With its blindness
to all but the single dimension of class rank, the Top Ten Percent Plan . .. [passed] over large numbers
of highly qualified minority and non-minority applicants.")
110. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (describing narrow tailoring as "a careful judicial inquiry into
whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial classifications").
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Involved. Consider again Justice Kennedy's observation: "If school
authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain
schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational
opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious
measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each
student in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual
typing by race.""'
The Court's acceptance of the percent plan is significant for another
reason. The Court's acceptance of the percent plan demonstrates that
government may act in race-conscious but facially neutral ways to promote
equal opportunity, even where the state achieves this goal by altering the
selection standards governing a competitive process. Justice Scalia recently
made a similar point in defending the constitutionality of Michigan's ban
on affirmative action in Schuette v. BAMN.112 Those who enacted
Michigan's ban on affirmative action sought to change selection procedures
that employed affirmative action'-presumably with the race-conscious
goal of making the results of the selection process more equitable."4
Justice Scalia emphasizes that the state's purposes, even if race-conscious,
did not amount to a discriminatory purpose, as a matter of law: "In my
view, any law expressly requiring state actors to afford all persons equal
protection of the laws ... does not-cannot-deny 'to any person ... equal
protection of the laws'. . . regardless of whatever evidence of seemingly
foul purposes plaintiffs may cook up in the trial court."'15
In sanctioning the percent plan and the affirmative action ban, the
Roberts Court has demonstrated that government may change the selection
standards in competitive processes without triggering strict scrutiny if the
government acts (1) with a race-conscious goal of promoting equal
opportunity; (2) the government requires a selection standard that is
appropriate for the context; and (3) the standard does not classify
individuals by race. Judged by these criteria, both the Texas percent plan
and the Michigan ban on affirmative action are constitutional. Both pursue
a race-conscious goal of promoting equal opportunity. Each promotes
selection standards that appear to conform with meritocratic norms. Neither
law employs a selection standard that classifies individuals by race or
111. Parents Involved in Cnty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788-89 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
112. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
113. Id. at 1629.
114. See infra note 115.
115. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1648 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia observes that
citizens may enact affirmative action bans for race-conscious reasons-because they are "opposed in
principle to the notion of 'benign' racial discrimination"-and he approvingly characterizes the
resulting bans as "racial-neutral alternatives." Id at 1639.
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selects only members of one racial group. Consequently, neither should
trigger strict scrutiny.
Judged by these standards, the disparate impact framework is
constitutional. Congress can (1) prohibit selection standards with
unjustified racial disparate impact (2) in order to promote equal
opportunity-to remedy and deter covert intentional discrimination,
unconscious bias, and the legacy of past intentional discrimination. The
purposes of disparate impact may be race-conscious but they do not amount
to discriminatory purposes within the meaning of Feeney"6-even if
Congress undertakes to remedy and deter more forms of racial bias than the
judicially enforced provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment require.
The narrow tailoring cases answer Justice Scalia's suggestion in Ricci
that disparate impact may be constitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause only to the extent it redresses intentional discrimination,H7 a
suggestion Justice Scalia has never reconciled with his own support for
race-conscious, race-neutral state action in the affirmative action cases. In
Croson, Justice Scalia explained: "A State can, of course, act 'to undo the
effects of past discrimination' in many permissible ways that do not
involve classification by race. In the particular field of state contracting, for
example, it may adopt a preference for small businesses, or even for new
businesses-which would make it easier for those previously excluded by
discrimination to enter the field. Such programs may well have racially
disproportionate impact, but they are not based on race."1 18 In Fisher, no
Justice suggested that the constitutionality of the percent plan depends on
whether its purpose is to rectify intentional discrimination only; to the
contrary, Fisher approvingly discusses race-neutral alternatives for
achieving diversity.119 However Justice Scalia ultimately chooses to
116. As the Second Circuit has explained, the fact that the government designed a test with
attention to racial disparate impact "does not demonstrate that the [government] designed the . . . exam
'because of some desire to adversely affect" the other applicants. Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d
42, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)) ("Nothing
suggests that the County sought o disadvantage appellants, or that the County was propelled by sinister
or invidious motivations. A desire to reduce the adverse impact on black applicants and rectify hiring
practices which the County admitted in the 1982 consent order might support an inference of
discrimination is not analogous to an intent to discriminate against non-minority candidates.").
117. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It might be possible to defend the law
by framing it as simply an evidentiary tool used to identify genuine, intentional discrimination-to
'smoke out,' as it were, disparate treatment.. . . But arguably the disparate-impact provisions sweep too
broadly to be fairly characterized in such a fashion . . . .") (citations omitted). The only justification for
disparate impact liability that Justice Scalia recognized as weighty enough to save the law's
constitutionality was that disparate impact liability might police for intentional discrimination. Id. ("It is
one thing to free plaintiffs from proving an employer's illicit intent, but quite another to preclude the
employer from proving that its motives were pure and its actions reasonable.").
118. Croson, 488 U.S. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
119. See supra text accompanying note 7.
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reconcile his position in Ricci with his opinions in the affirmative action
cases, it is clear that in the affirmative action cases most Justices of the
Roberts Court have affirmed race-conscious but race-neutral efforts to
achieve diversity and equality of opportunity. In sum then, it is not simply
that the purposes of disparate impact law are constitutional under the
definition of discriminatory purpose that the Court adopted in Feeney;
Fisher and the affirmative action cases show that government can act to
promote equal opportunity-to remedy and deter covert intentional
discrimination, unconscious bias, and the legacy of past intentional
discrimination-and to promote diversity by race-neutral means.
As importantly, Fisher and Schuette demonstrate that Congress has
chosen constitutional means to achieve a constitutional end. To promote
equal opportunity, Congress may prohibit selection standards with an
unjustified disparate impact, so long as Congress requires tandards that are
context-appropriate and do not classify by race. This is exactly how
disparate impact laws operate. The framework allows selection standards
with racial disparate impact where the employer can show the selection
standards are "business related"; the framework prohibits selection
standards with racial disparate impact only in cases where the employer
could as effectively achieve its business needs by means that had less
exclusionary impact.12 0 The disparate impact framework may lead decision
makers to adopt new facially neutral standards that foreseeably select
different persons from majority and minority groups, but this shift in
standards is not enough to make the disparate impact framework
unconstitutional.121 The percent plan in Fisher and the affirmative action
ban in Schuette foreseeably select for a demographically different group of
applicants and in neither case was this sufficient to make the change in
standards unconstitutional.12 2
120. See supra text at note 16.
121. Most cases of disparate impact compliance, whether adjudicated or administrative, involve
a change of standards that will select for a different group of minority and majority group members, just
as the laws in Fisher and Schuette did. See Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable
Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1197, 1238 (2003) (noting that
"[t]he standard judicial remedy in a Title VII disparate impact case requires the employer to change the
policy or standard for everybody, not just the protected group," as the Court did in Griggs, stating that
"if a high school diploma requirement has a disparate impact on blacks that cannot be justified by
business necessity, a Title VII court would order the employer to drop the requirement for whites as
well as blacks"); Michelle A. Travis, Toward Positive Equality: Taking the Disparate Impact Out of
Disparate Impact Theory, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 527, 547-48 (2012) (noting that "[tihe core
remedy for a successful disparate impact claim is practice-specific rather than plaintiff-specific," so that
"the standard remedy is to enjoin the employer from using that practice in the future" which "will assist
all others whom the practice harms or excludes").
122. Foreseeable racial disparate impact is not alone enough to make state action
unconstitutional. Discriminatory purpose doctrine allows government to adopt practices with
foreseeable disparate racial impact-whether condemning "blighted" property, see infra note 165, or
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Not surprisingly, the constitutionality of disparate impact law was
never questioned for decades. Equal protection principles enunciated in the
case law of the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts amply support the
constitutionality of disparate impact. Nor is some change of course
imminent. The laws the Court sanctioned in Fisher and Schuette undermine
the kind of direct facial challenge to disparate impact Justice Scalia
advances in Ricci.123
V. RICCI REDUX: How MEANS AND MEANING MATTER
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Ricci does
not suggest that disparate impact law is facially unconstitutional. Rather,
the majority opinion in Ricci focuses on New Haven's actions in
voluntarily complying with the federal employment discrimination law.
There is no doubt that the steps New Haven took voluntarily to comply
with the federal employment discrimination statute were unusual, if not
unprecedented. After learning that no black candidates scored high enough
on the written civil service exam to be considered for an officer position in
the fire department,124 and hearing complaints from minority employees
that the test had a racial disparate impact,'2 5 the City announced it would
void the results of the test, and retest the applicants using a new promotion
exam. 126 The City's approach to complying with Title VII was certainly
irregular, but was it unlawful?
A constitutional injury is not immediately evident. Was the City acting
from an unconstitutional purpose when it announced that it would
administer a new promotion exam? If not, did the City classify its
employees on the basis of race?
The City had race-conscious reasons for changing the selection
standard, but it is hard to see how they amount to a discriminatory purpose
within the meaning of Feeney. The City learned from the testing company
that its initial exam would result in the promotion of a virtually-all white
cohort of candidates-a message conveyed to the City without information
imposing higher sentences on crack than on powder cocaine, see supra note 47 (discussing the Sixth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2013)).
123. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Title VII's disparate-impact provisions
place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their
policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial
decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, discriminatory.").
124. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
125. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562.
126. Id.
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about individual scores.'27 The City then appears to have changed its
selection standard to avoid Title VII liability, to reduce the chance it might
be using a racially biased selection standard, and to appease its estranged
minority employees 28-not out of a desire to harm or exclude whites. The
City appears to have acted, not because of, but in spite of, the impact on
whites. If an impact on whites was a foreseeable effect of the City's change
in standards, harming white applicants was not the City's reason for action
any more than harming white applicants was Texas's reason for choosing
the percent plan.
Even if the City acted for legitimate reasons, did the City employ
constitutional means to achieve its constitutional ends? The City did not
initially give the applications of individual minority candidates a "plus,"
discriminate among individual applicants, or otherwise employ "individual
racial classifications"12 9 of the kind featured in the Court's affirmative
action cases. Would the new test have classified applicants on the basis of
race?
We do not know what new test New Haven would have used. But let us
assume that in changing the promotion test, the City looked for a new exam
that would test in a different way for the skills needed to do the job, in the
hopes of selecting a group of candidates that did not exclude all black
applicants.13 0 If so, in modifying its selection standard, New Haven would
127. Id. at 567 (The director of the City's Department of Human Resources opened the meeting
by telling the civil service board that "'there is a significant disparate impact on these two exams' [and]
distributed lists showing the candidates' races and scores (written, oral, and composite) but not their
names.") (citation omitted).
128. See id. at 567-74; see also id. at 612-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
129. Strict scrutiny is reserved for practices that "distribute burdens or benefits on the basis of
individual racial classifications," Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1647-48 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 720 (2007)); as Justice Scalia emphasizes, a "law that 'neither says nor implies that persons
are to be treated differently on account of their race' is not a racial classification." Id. (citation
omitted)).
130. Justice Ginsburg points to alternative testing methods suggested by experts, such as "an
assessment center process, which is essentially an opportunity for candidates ... to demonstrate how
they would address a particular problem as opposed to just verbally saying it or identifying the correct
option on a written test." Ricci, 557 U.S. at 615 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Brief of Industrial-
Organizational Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 32, Ricci, 557 U.S. 557
(Nos. 07-1428, 08-328) ("It is ... well-recognized in the research literature that assessment centers
reduce adverse impact on racial minorities as compared to traditional standardized tests.").
Justice Ginsburg notes that New Haven failed to consider "what sort of 'practical' examination would
'fairly measure the relative fitness and capacity of the applicants to discharge the duties' of a fire
officer." Ricci, 557 U.S. at 611 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She then notes that "Bridgeport ... had once
used a testing process similar to New Haven's, with a written exam accounting for 70 percent of an
applicant's score, an oral exam for 25 percent, and seniority for the remaining five percent. Bridgeport
recognized, however, that the oral component, more so than the written component, addressed the sort
of 'real-life scenarios' fire officers encounter on the job. Accordingly, that city 'changed the relative
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have chosen a race-conscious but facially neutral means of serving its
business needs that would also reduce the chance of bias and increase the
diversity of its workforce. The City's interest in adopting a new selection
standard is amply sanctioned by the narrow tailoring cases, and resembles
Texas's decision to adopt the percent plan.
What then was the constitutional concern to which Justice Kennedy
adverted, and which he used a decision on Title VII grounds to avoid? If no
purpose that was discriminatory within the meaning of Feeney motivated
the change in exam, and the substituted exam was appropriate to context
and did not classify individuals by race, what did the City do that raised
constitutional concerns? The question leads us to what is unusual, if not
unprecedented, and for many quite disturbing about the Ricci facts. The
City's change in exams was procedurally irregular in certain important
respects. New Haven did much more than modify its selection standard.
The City (1) jettisoned the test after administering it, (2) giving the
applicants openly race-related reasons for discarding their test results.'3 '
Justice Kennedy objected to just these features of New Haven's
actions: "[O]nce [a promotions] process ha[s] been established and
employers have made clear their selection criteria, they may not then
invalidate the test results, thus upsetting an employee's legitimate
expectation not o be judged on the basis of race."'1 32 He further explained:
The problem, of course, is that after the tests were completed, the
raw racial results became the predominant rationale for the City's
refusal to certify the results. The injury arises in part from the high,
and justified, expectations of the candidates who had participated
in the testing process on the terms the City had established for the
promotional process. Many of the candidates had studied for
months, at considerable personal and financial expense, and thus
the injury caused by the City's reliance on raw racial statistics at
the end of the process was all the more severe. 133
The fact that New Haven discarded the results of white and minority
applicants who had already taken the exam was of crucial importance to the
majority. The reliance interest of white job applicants in Ricci may have
been more attenuated than the reliance interest of white job holders
threatened by a lay-off agreement giving preferences to minority
weights' to give primacy to the oral exam. Since that time . .. Bridgeport had seen minorities 'fairly
represented' in its exam results." Id. at 614 (citations omitted).
131. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
132. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585.
133. Id. at 593.
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employees in Wygant; 134 even so, the majority emphasized Wygant-like
reliance concerns.135 A second exacerbating factor was the race-related
reason for retesting which the City gave the applicants. The City explained
that the test had a racial disparate impact, telling applicants the race, but not
the names, of high and low scoring applicants, so that all of the individuals
the City addressed knew that white applicants had performed better than
minority applicants, even if they did not know which individual white
applicants had done so.136 The Ricci majority reasoned about this message
as the plaintiffs likely did, as if each white applicant had been "told" he
would have been awarded a promotion, but for race.
Justice Kennedy's concern about the racial message the City
communicated to the applicants echoes the concerns he expressed in
Parents Involved when he explained why districting and other race-
conscious but facially neutral means of increasing diversity were
presumptively constitutional and affirmative action was not: "These
mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based
on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race,
so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found
permissible."'3 7
For the majority, then, it was not the City's decision to comply with
disparate impact law that was presumptively unlawful or unconstitutional.
134. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that a collective bargaining
agreement which altered the standard seniority-based retention system to ensure that minorities were
not disproportionately laid off violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
135. Justice Kennedy discusses Wygant in Ricci, and draws the "strong basis in evidence"
standard from a passage of Croson that quotes Wygant. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 581-82. See infra note
142.
136. See supra note 127.
137. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). Unlike the admissions policy in
Parents Involved, the exam used to determine promotions in the Ricci case did not classify individuals
by race. Race nonetheless became unusually prominent in the promotions process because the City
threw out scores of a test it had already administered, for race-related reasons likely to disadvantage
some applicant with reliance interests.
The elements of (1) procedural irregularity and (2) open consideration of race distinguish the
Ricci facts from an ordinary case of disparate impact compliance. These features of the Ricci case bring
to mind the voting rights cases involving districts that are so strangely drawn that their race-conscious
design is legible to the public. These voting rights cases hold that race cannot be the "predominant"
factor in the legislators' decision-not that race conscious districting always triggers strict scrutiny. See,
e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (Kennedy, J. for the majority) ("Redistricting
legislatures will... almost always be aware of racial demographics, but it does not follow that race
predominates in the redistricting process"); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 993 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (1996) ("[S]o long as they do not subordinate traditional districting criteria to the use of
race for its own sake or as a proxy, States may intentionally create majority-minority districts, and may
otherwise take race into consideration, without coming under strict scrutiny... . Only if traditional




In fact, Justice Kennedy goes out of his way to protect the efforts of
employers voluntarily to comply with the disparate impact provisions of
Title VII law. The Ricci majority emphasizes that employers can modify
tests before they administer them, and explains that involving employees
during test design can foster constructive relations in the workplace: "Title
VII does not prohibit an employer from considering, before administering a
test or practice, how to design that test or practice in order to provide a fair
opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race. And when, during
the test-design stage, an employer invites comments to ensure the test is
fair, that process can provide a common ground for open discussions
toward that end."'138 A properly administered promotion exam can build the
confidence of all employees in the fairness of selection devices. If the
selection process is done with care, and in a fashion that earns the
employees' trust, it is a source of confidence and community, rather than
division. In this way, proper compliance with disparate impact law can
guard against balkanization of the workplace. As Justice Kennedy explains:
"Employment ests can be an important part of a neutral selection system
that safeguards against the very racial animosities Title VII was intended
to prevent. Here, however, the firefighters saw their efforts invalidated by
the City in sole reliance upon race-based statistics."l3 9
What made New Haven's actions problematic, then, was the irregular
way in which the City complied with disparate impact law: by offering
openly race-related reasons for changing promotion standards for an
identified group of applicants who had already tested for the job. Changing
standards in this way is not a normal method of Title VII compliance, a
normal exercise of employer prerogatives, or the normal expression of
meritocracy. However legitimate the government's ends may have been,
the means it employed to achieve them violated the "high, and justified,
expectations of the candidates who had participated in the testing process
on the terms the City had established for the promotional process,"40
replacing a meritocratic competition with a system of.hiring that the
applicants were expressly told would focus on race. This means of
achieving the government's legitimate ends, Justice Kennedy emphasizes,
is likely to be intensely divisive, to stimulate "the very racial animosities
Title VII was intended to prevent."'41 Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy judged the City's attempt to discard test results as disparate
treatment of the applicants, and in future cases required government to
138. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585.
139. Id at 584 (emphasis added).
140. Id at 593.
141. Id. at 584 (quoted in full at supra text accompanying note 139).
682 [Vol. 66:3:653
2015] Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral 683
show that it had a "strong basis in evidence" before engaging in disparate
treatment of the kind involved in the City's decision to discard test
results. 142
To come full circle, New Haven's irregular approach to complying
with disparate impact law differs significantly from the change of selection
standards in Fisher and Schuette. In those cases, the Court has
demonstrated that government may change the selection standards in
competitive processes without triggering strict scrutiny if the government
acts (1) with a race-conscious goal of promoting equal opportunity; (2) the
government requires a selection standard that is appropriate for the context;
and (3) the standard does not classify by race.14 3 These principles are
satisfied in the ordinary case of voluntary disparate impact compliance, in
which an employer specifies conditions for employment in advance of
evaluating applicants for the job in question, as well as in prospective
remedies that courts ordinarily order for violations of Title VII. 144
142. See id. at 582 ("The Court has held that certain government actions to remedy past racial
discrimination-actions that are themselves based on race-are constitutional only where there is a
'strong basis in evidence' that the remedial actions were necessary." (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277
(1986) (plurality opinion))).
Courts are still debating the circumstances in which an employer would have to meet the strong
basis in evidence standard announced in Ricci. The Ricci opinion announces the standard as
constraining employers' freedom to engage in disparate treatment by discarding test results for racial
reasons, and repeatedly discusses the standard as concerning the employer's ability voluntarily to
discard test results:
If an employer cannot rescore a test based on the candidates' race, § 2000e-2(l ), then it
follows afortiori that it may not take the greater step of discarding the test altogether to
achieve a more desirable racial distribution of promotion-eligible candidates-absent a
strong basis in evidence that he test was deficient and that discarding the results is necessary
to avoid violating the disparate-impact provision. Restricting an employer's ability to
discard test results (and thereby discriminate against qualified candidates on the basis of
their race) also is in keeping with Title VII's express protection of bona fide promotional
examinations.... For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the strong-basis-in evidence standard
as a matter of statutory construction to resolve any conflict between the disparate-treatment
and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII. I
Id. at 584 (citations omitted); see also id. at 581-82, 585. Accord Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654
F.3d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[A]ll other indications in the opinion are of a holding limited to
formulation of a standard for disparate-treatment liability... . '[r]estricting an employer's ability to
discard test results."' (quoting Ricci, 557 U.S. at 584) (alteration in original).
If the strong basis in evidence standard does apply in any context other than discarding test
results, it would have to involve disparate treatment of applicants analogous to New Haven's actions in
voiding the test scores of applicants for announced racial reasons. The standard does not constrain
employer decisions to revise exams before applicants for an open position take the exam. Cf supra text
accompanying note 138.
143. See supra Part IV.B.
144. Most cases of disparate impact compliance, whether adjudicated or administrative, involve
a change of standards that will select for a different group of minority and majority group members, just
as the laws in Fisher and Schuette did. See Schwab & Willborn, supra note 121, at 1238 ("The standard
judicial remedy in a Title VII disparate impact case requires the employer to change the policy or
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Even though the Court did not declare that the city violated the
Constitution, the Court's ruling on the statutory question suggests that the
city acted in ways that raised grave constitutional questions. This
conclusion is striking, as it appears that in endeavoring to comply with
Title VII, the city did not act from a discriminatory purpose within the
meaning of the equal protection cases, nor did the city alter the
employment status of applicants by discriminating among individuals on
the basis of race.14 5 The city's action in complying with Title VII seemed to
fit comfortably within the Court's narrow tailoring decisions, just as the
percent plan did, but for the city's decision to comply by jettisoning the
exam results of a group of applicants for openly race-related reasons.
Is this difference of means of constitutional magnitude? Ricci does not
answer this question squarely, yet the Court intimates that it may be.
Government may act to remedy past discrimination, promote equal
opportunity, and achieve diversity, but Justice Kennedy seems to be
warning, it must pursue these ends with care, by means that do not violate
citizen expectations of fair dealing.
"[E]mpathy" and "concern about protecting expectations of fair dealing
that citizens have in interacting with the government" shapes the Court's
affirmative action cases.14 6 Ricci shows that the Roberts Court could extend
this concern beyond affirmative action law requiring strict scrutiny of
individual racial classifications to the review of at least certain forms of
benign facially neutral state action as well. A city offering race-related
reasons for irregular treatment of an identified group of job applicants with
a reliance interest in the process might be such a case, Justice Kennedy
suggested. Without finding discriminatory purpose or a racial classification
standard for everybody, not just the protected group," as the Court did in Griggs, stating that "if a high
school diploma requirement has a disparate impact on blacks that cannot be justified by business
necessity, a Title VII court would order the employer to drop the requirement for whites as well as
blacks."); Travis, supra note 121, at 547-48 ("The core remedy for a successful disparate impact claim
is practice-specific rather than plaintiff-specific," so that "the standard remedy is to enjoin the employer
from using that practice in the future" which "will assist all others whom the practice harms or
excludes.").
145. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
146. See Siegel, supra note 48, at 31 ("Early justifications for judicial oversight suggest that he
Justices who first applied strict scrutiny to affirmative action acted from empathy: they fashioned a
body of equal protection law that cares about the impact of state action on citizens, and about citizens'
confidence in the fairness of the state, in ways that the discriminatory purpose decisions of the Burger
Court do not."); id. at 45 (discussing modem strict scrutiny as a body of law "designed to constrain the
means by which government promotes diversity or pursues remedial ends that is focused on protecting
expectations of fair dealing that citizens have in interacting with the government. These concerns shape
not only the quantitative limits the decisions impose on affirmative action, but also the requirements the
decisions impose on affirmative action's form").
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as its equal protection case law seems to require,147 the Ricci majority
expresses concern about the appearance, impact, and public meaning of
race-conscious but race-neutral state action, worrying about the ways
ordinary citizens will understand and experience the challenged
government action. Concern of this kind is welcome, if extended even-
handedly; but in too many cases involving overtly racial state action that
violates citizen expectations of fair dealing, judges invoke doctrines of
discriminatory purpose to deny relief to minority claimants. 148
That said, it is clear that the circumstances triggering constitutional
avoidance in Ricci are quite particular. They involve an irregular act of
disparate impact compliance, in which the government discarded the test
results of a group of applicants who had invested significant time in
studying for a promotion exam, and explained its decision in terms which
left the disappointed applicants with the impression that government was
discarding their scores to advance the interests of another racially defined
group. It is not surprising that New Haven's irregular course of compliance
would concern a justice who allows affirmative action subject o strict
scrutiny in order to constrain what he believes are its potentially
balkanizing effects.149
Disparate impact law can promote equal opportunity, lessen racial
stratification, increase employee confidence in the fairness of selection
criteria, and thus reduce racial balkanization; but for disparate impact law
to do so, Justice Kennedy seems to be saying in Ricci, disparate impact law
needs to be enforced with attention to all employees' expectations of fair
dealing, that is, enforced with care not to excite racial balkanization. By
finding New Haven's manner of complying with the statute unlawful
disparate treatment, Kennedy warns that interventions designed to heal
social division should be implemented in ways that do not aggravate social
147. Cf Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1647 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting "the
exceptionless nature of the Washington v. Davis rule" and the "'unwavering line of cases from this
Court hold[ing] that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause requires state action motivated by
discriminatory intent"' (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 372-73 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
148. See Siegel, supra note 48, at 47-51.
149. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Governmental classifications that
command people to march in different directions based on racial typologies can cause a new
divisiveness. The practice can lead to corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element of our
diverse heritage but instead as a bargaining chip in the political process."). I have previously shown
how the "antibalkanization" concerns of "racial moderates" such as Justice Kennedy have shaped cases
on affirmative action and disparate impact. See Siegel, supra note 62; see also Neil S. Siegel, The
Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REv. 959, 1003-14 (2008) (discussing these themes in
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved).
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division.150 Implemented with care, a disparate impact framework can build
the confidence of minority and majority communities in the fairness of
selection procedures, redress discrimination, reduce balkanization, and
promote racial solidarity.'
150. I would distinguish this reading from Richard Primus's account of the case on several
grounds. Primus reads Ricci as possibly suggesting all disparate impact law is unconstitutional. See
Primus, supra 18 at 1362 (offering three possible readings of disparate impact in Ricci, all three of
which he believes are "plausible": what he terms the "general reading," in which "any operation of the
disparate impact standard is an equal protection problem;" the "institutional reading," in which "the
disparate treatment . . . problem in Ricci arose because the actor that implemented a disparate impact
remedy was a public employer rather than a court;" and the "visible victims reading," in which "the
city's conduct in Ricci was a disparate treatment . . . problem because it adversely affected specific and
visible innocent parties"); see also Helen Norton, The Supreme Court's Post-Racial Turn Towards A
Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 234-35 (2010) (noting that
"Ricci's redefinition of culpable mental state for antidiscrimination destabilizes ... the long-standing
assumption that the Court does not view government's attention to race to achieve antisubordination
ends as itself suspicious" and describing possible ways to read "the Court's move" in Ricci, including
"a new zero-sum understanding of equality").
As I have shown, Primus's "general reading" of Ricci is inconsistent with Justice Kennedy's
reasoning in Parents Involved, Fisher, and Ricci itself. The antibalkanization reading of Ricci I offer
here, and in earlier writing, see Siegel, supra note 62, resembles what Primus terms the "visible-victims
reading." Michelle Adams also narrows Ricci's meaning along these lines. See Michelle Adams, Is
Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?, 96 IOWA. L. REV. 837, 837, 875 (2011) (explaining that "the
lesson of Ricci is not that governmental action with an integrative motive is always prohibited (at least
for now); instead it is that racial harm really matters" and that "the concept of 'because of race does not
include facially race-neutral, yet race-dependent, government action where the effect on white students
is diffuse and amorphous . .. "). What my antibalkanization reading emphasizes is that Justice
Kennedy's opinions in Ricci, Parents Involved, and Fisher all affirm, as well as limit, race-conscious
state action promoting equal opportunity. As I point out in text, a central theme of Justice Kennedy's
equal protection opinions is that government may intervene in race-conscious ways to heal social
division, but should strive to do so in ways that do not aggravate social division.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 139-140; Ricci, 557 U.S. at 584 ("Employment tests
can be an important part of a neutral selection system that safeguards against the very racial animosities
Title VII was intended to prevent. Here, however, the firefighters saw their efforts invalidated by the
City in sole reliance upon race-based statistics."); see generally Siegel, supra note 62, at 1348 (citations
omitted):
Forms of community forged at work, as at school, can divide or unite us. When employers
hire and promote on the basis of criteria that have an unjustified racial disparate impact
(because employers have hidden or unconscious biases or are selecting for traits associated
with current jobholders rather than for the skills needed to do the job), they are not only
perpetuating group inequality but also exacerbating balkanization in the workplace. The
disparate impact framework provides incentives for employers to ensure that the
employment criteria used select among applicants in race-salient ways-only insofar as
needed to do the job in question. A workplace organized in this way is more likely to be and
to be seen as open to all applicants. Thus, as the disparate impact framework ameliorates
unjust social stratification, it also can alleviate balkanization-the rationale that Justice
O'Connor offered for affirmative action.
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VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In the wake of Ricci, a number of commentators have suggested that
the decision results from a "zero-sum" conception of equality,15 2 reflecting
the belief that status gains of minorities come at the expense of whites.5 3
As Senator Jeff Sessions memorably expressed zero-sum concerns at
Justice Sotomayor's confirmation hearings: "Empathy for one party is
always prejudice against another."'54 This blunt expression of zero-sum
anxiety does not adequately explain the Court's decisions in Fisher and
Ricci which each treat some forms of race-conscious state action as more
constitutionally problematic than others.
People differ in their beliefs about the practices that present zero-sum
threats to their status. Some may believe all race-conscious but facially
neutral efforts to promote equal opportunity-such as percent plans-are
constitutionally suspect.'55 But objections premised on zero-sum beliefs
may instead be intermittently aroused, provoked by actions that convey a
certain "social meaning,"5 6  give rise to "identifiable harms,,,51 or
stimulate "racial animosities."'58
In Fisher, no Justice expressed suspicions about the constitutionality of
the Texas percent plan, which was plainly designed to help a different
152. See Norton, supra note 150, at 197 ("[A] post-racial discomfort with noticing and acting
upon race supports a zero-sum approach to equality: if race no longer matters to the distribution of life
opportunities, a decision maker's concern for the disparities experienced by members of one racial
group may be seen as inextricable from its intent to discriminate against others"); Michael I. Norton &
Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON
PSYCHOL. Scl. 215, 215 (2011) (finding that Whites view "racism as a zero-sum game, such that
decreases in perceived bias against Blacks over the past six decades are associated with increases in
perceived bias against Whites"); see also Room for Debate: Is Anti-White Bias a Problem?, N.Y.
TIMES.COM (May 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/22/is-anti-white-bias-a-
problem (discussing Norton & Sommers' study).
153. See, e.g., Allen R. Kamp, Ricci v. DeStefano and Disparate Treatment: How the Case
Makes Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause Unworkable, 39 CAP. U. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2011) ("One
can read Ricci as holding that an employer's adoption of the anti-subordination principle is itself illegal
discrimination. Employment is seen as a zero-sum game: changing the system for the benefit of
minorities necessarily constitutes discrimination against non-minorities."); Norton, supra note 150, at
229, 236 (discussing zero-sum readings of Ricci and alternatives); George Rutherglen, Ricci v.
DeStefano: Affirmative Action and the Lessons ofAdversity, 2009 SUP. CT. REv. 83, 85.
154. See Statement of the Honorable Jeff Sessions: Hearing on Judge Sotomayor 's Supreme
Court Confirmation Before the S., 11Ith Cong. (2009), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/sessionsstatement_07_13_09.pdf
155. See Kamp, supra note 153, at 32-33 (citing Marcus, supra note 19, at 73); see also Norton,
supra note 150, at 233; Abigail Thernstrom, An Old Source ofResentment, N.Y. TIMES.COM, (May 23,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/22/is-anti-white-bias-a-problem/an-old-source-
of-resentment.
156. Kamp, supra note 153, at 32-33; Norton, supra note 150, at 198.
157. See Girardeau A. Spann, PostracialDiscrimination, 5 MOD. AM. 26, 34-35 (2009); see also
Adams, supra note 150 at 837 (discussing "racial harm"); Norton, supra note 150, at 236.
158. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 584.
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group of white and minority applicants get into college than had been
admitted before. Not every act of government concern about minorities will
trigger or sustain a reverse discrimination claim. In Ricci, however, a
majority of the Court opposed New Haven's action in discarding the
promotion test, suggesting that an irregular act of disparate impact
compliance in which the government provided race-related reasons for
discarding the test results of an identified group of job applicants would be
understood as motivated by concerns about minorities alone and so would
stimulate "racial animosities."l59
This comparison of the Court's reasoning in Fisher and Ricci suggests
that if the current Court imposes equal protection constraints on disparate
impact, it will not be for the reasons that Justice Scalia offered. Under the
Constitution as interpreted by the Roberts Court, government can act in
race-conscious ways to remedy past discrimination, promote equal
opportunity, and achieve diversity, in cases where the law is facially neutral
in form. Fisher shows these aims do not amount to a discriminatory
purpose within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause-at least not
yet.
The hostility Justice Scalia expressed towards disparate impact law
may be fueled by the belief that persisting racial stratification in the United
States is primarily attributable to racial group differences and not to the
effects of past and present discrimination-a view expressed by the Reagan
administration in attacking disparate impact law as securing "equality of
result" rather than "equality of opportunity."l60 But the Equal Protection
Clause does not enact Thomas Sowell,161 nor should the Equal Protection
Clause constitutionally entrench beliefs about racial group differences of
this kind.162 Baselines in the United States are still not race neutral, as
Justice Kennedy reasoned in explaining why he affirmed colorblindness as
an "aspiration," but not a "universal constitutional principle":
Today we enjoy a society that is remarkable in its openness and
opportunity. Yet our tradition is to go beyond present
159. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 584. Cf Rutherglen, supra note 153, at 85 ("If any general principle
emerges from Ricci, it is a hostility to zero-sum racial politics-justifying affirmative action for some
groups at the expense of others without any showing of collective benefit to the community as a
whole.").
160. See supra text accompanying notes 49-55 (discussing Thomas Sowell and other critics of
civil rights law during the Reagan era who pointed to racial group differences to explain the persisting
stratification of the workplace).
161. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The 14th
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
162. Cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) ("Legislation is powerless to eradicate
racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can
only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.").
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achievements, however significant, and to recognize and confront
the flaws and injustices that remain. This is especially true when
we seek assurance that opportunity is not denied on account of
race. The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality
is that too often it does.163
Legislative and administrative disparate impact standards provide tools
to probe for hidden or unconscious bias in government decision making-
whether in the decision of a city to contract with a firefighters union to fix
the weight of written and oral tests for employment,'" or the decision of a
city to condemn property as blighted for urban renewal purposes.165
Employed appropriately, these tools remain constitutional. In the Roberts
Court, the Constitution still allows government to combat the legacy of
discrimination, past and present, and to secure equal opportunity for all.
163. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787-89 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added)). For other opinions
reasoning along similar lines, see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
164. See Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200, 202 (2d. Cir. 2011) (challenging "the
weighting of the written and oral sections of the test-60% and 40%, respectively, as dictated by the
collective bargaining agreement between the city and the firefighters' union-was arbitrary and
unrelated to job requirements [and asserting] that the industry norm for such weighting was 30%
written/70% oral") (citation omitted).
165. A city's decision to condemn a neighborhood as blighted figured in a disparate impact case
recently before the Court. See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 2, Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens
Citizens in Action, Inc., cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013)
(No. 11-1507) ("This case comes to the Court after more than a decade of litigation over a small New
Jersey Township's decision in 2002 to redevelop a blighted residential area that all parties agree was
and is in serious need of government intervention."); see also Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action,
Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 377-78 (3d Cir. 2011) (analyzing a disparate impact challenge
under the Fair Housing Act to a township's plan to redevelop a 30-acre "blighted" neighborhood
"comprised predominantly of African--American and Hispanic residents" who "earn less than 80% of
the area's median income; with most earning much less"), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), cert.
dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013). For scholarship on blight, see Equal Justice Society & Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati, Lessons from Mt. Holly: Leading Scholars Demonstrate Need for Disparate Impact
Standard to Combat Implicit Bias, 11 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 241, 247-48 (2014) ("Social
science research reveals that underlying implicit biases play a large role in housing decision-making
that perpetuates segregation.. . . Recent social science research shows that implicit biases manifest in
perceptions of disorder, criminality, and blight. In housing and land use planning, these psychological
perceptions inform government and individual actions and ultimately harm minority communities.");
Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" ofBlight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses ofEminent
Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 6 (2003) ("The role of blight terminology in restricting racial
mobility has also been under-appreciated by legal scholars. Blight was a facially neutral term infused
with racial and ethnic prejudice. While it purportedly assessed the state of urban infrastructure, blight
was often used to describe the negative impact of certain residents on city neighborhoods.")

